This article investigates an important channel through which access to information about market prices could increase the prices that producers receive from middlemen. I develop a model of trade between a farmer and a middleman, allowing for middlemen to differ in terms of their social preferences, and provide an empirical test of the theory using a framed field experiment carried out in India. The model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching to a new middleman. I find that actual middlemen do differ with regard to their social preferences, and that the benefit of information to the farmer varies with the cost of switching. While it is not possible to confirm a non-monotonic relationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching based on these data, the results are consistent with the predictions of the model.
It seems intuitive to believe that more information gives us more power. But is this always true? In reality, information only helps us when we can use it to make better choices. If our ability to change our actions is restricted, having extra information may not improve our outcomes. This article investigates this issue with a particular market in mind-the market for agricultural goods in developing countries.
Agricultural supply chains are often dominated by middlemen with substantial market power. A potential source of this power lies in the fact that middlemen are better informed about market conditions, especially the prices further down the supply chain (Courtois and Subervie 2015) . This raises the possibility that better access to market information could increase the prices that farmers receive from middlemen, thereby increasing their income and helping them to make better production decisions.
While a number of empirical papers have investigated the effect that access to information can have on market prices (Jensen 2007; Aker 2010; Goyal 2010) , the structure of the middlemen market has not received much attention. This article aims to address this gap in the literature by presenting a theoretical model that demonstrates the relative roles that switching costs and information can play in the middleman market. The approach allows for the presence of different types of middlemen, and for farmers to switch to a different buyer between periods. The article provides an empirical test of the theory from an original framed field experiment carried out with actual farmers and middlemen in Gujarat, India. 1 Tara Mitchell is an assistant professor in the Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin. The author is grateful to Tim Besley and Greg Fischer for their support and advice throughout this project, and Oriana Bandiera, Gharad Bryan, Sandip Mitra, Gerard Padro i Miquel, and seminar participants at London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and Indian Statistical Institute (ISI), Kolkata, for helpful comments and discussions. This project would not have been possible without the help of Reuters Market Light in facilitating the experimental sessions, and the excellent research assistance in the field from Sharon Weir and Payal Mulchandani at 4 th Wheel. The author would also like to thank the editor and anonymous referees for their comments and helpful suggestions. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. This project was supported by the Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD), LSE. Correspondence may be sent to: mitchet@tcd.ie. This article makes two main contributions. The first is that it investigates the relationship between information and the cost of switching to a new trading partner in an environment characterized by heterogeneous agents. The presented model will allow for unobserved heterogeneity among players and will show that in this context, a lack of information about another aspect of the environment, for example, the market value of the good, can have important effects. I will also argue that the impact of this lack of information will depend on the level of the switching cost and that this relationship is nonmonotonic.
The second contribution that this article makes is that it focuses on a particular type of heterogeneity-social preferences-and examines its role among a sample of middlemen and farmers in India. The type of social preferences focused on here is an individual's willingness to deviate from a moral norm. There may be a certain value of the division of surplus that the middleman considers to be morally right, and therefore he may feel some guilt or shame if he deviates from this value. This supposition is based on the idea that the middleman may feel a sense of sympathy for the farmer and will suffer some disutility from behaving toward him in a way that he would consider morally inappropriate. The level of disutility or guilt experienced from this may vary between individuals. This article investigates the potential impact that this type of heterogeneity among middlemen can have on outcomes for farmers when they are uninformed about market prices, in the context of a framed field experiment. The relevance of this form of social preferences in the environment under consideration in this article will be discussed in the next section.
This article will present a two-period model of trade between a farmer and a middleman. The farmer may encounter one of two types of middlemen. The autonomous type cares only about his monetary payoff from the two periods. The social type cares about his monetary payoff but also cares about adherence to a moral norm regarding the share of the surplus that the farmer should receive. The middleman's type is unobservable by the farmer. Between periods, the farmer may switch to trading with a different middleman but he must pay a cost to do so. For simplicity, it is assumed that the middleman makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the farmer. This is unlikely to be true in reality but the results of the model should still hold in the case where the farmer has some bargaining power. All that is necessary to generate the results of the model is that some middlemen are unwilling to exploit their bargaining power to the maximum extent possible. The field experiment reported on here is mapped closely onto the setup of the model, and is used to investigate whether the posited heterogeneity among middlemen is observed in reality. Also, by exogenously varying the cost of switching to a different middleman, it is possible to test the prediction that the benefit of information varies with this switching cost.
The model presented in this article yields some intuitive predictions. The existence of different types of middlemen creates a new role for price information stressing selection as well as incentives. It is easier for the autonomous middleman to disguise his type if the farmer is uninformed about market price. If the cost of switching is either very high or very low, then market price information is not that useful for the farmer. However, for an intermediate level of the switching cost, information about the market price may improve the bargaining position of the farmer and lead to an increase in the price he receives.
A framed field experiment was carried out with approximately 300 farmers and middlemen in Gujarat, India. There were six treatment cells: two information treatments, and three costs of switching. The results from the experiment show that middlemen do vary in their social preferences, and that autonomous types tend to make lower offers in the second period of the game. In the first period, the autonomous type of middleman also makes higher offers when the farmer is informed. While it is not possible to confirm a nonmonotonic relationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching based on these data, the results are consistent with the predictions of the model. For all levels of switching costs, the farmer receives a higher average offer when he is informed, with the benefit of information varying with the switching cost.
A number of recent empirical papers have investigated the effects of better market information on producer prices, although results have been mixed. Some studies have found that improved access to market information has had a positive impact on farm-gate prices (Svensson and Yanagizawa 2009; Courtois and Subervie 2015) , whereas others have found no effect (Futch and McIntosh 2009; Fafchamps and Minten 2012) . In addition, a number of studies have demonstrated that within the same context, market information has a positive effect on farm-gate prices for some types of crops but no effect for others (Muto and Yamano 2009; Aker and Fafchamps 2015) . Molony (2008) and Mitra et al. (2013) both present evidence suggesting that the ability of producers to use price information may be limited by the fact that they are tied in to relationships with particular middlemen or have limited outside options for selling their output. The theoretical framework presented in this article could help us to interpret these results as they are consistent with the prediction that the effect of information may vary depending on what options are available to farmers.
The issue of middlemen exploiting farmers has been debated for decades (Bauer and Yamey 1968) . In general, the existing literature relating to middlemen has tended to view middlemen as either fulfilling an important role in the market (Biglaiser 1993; Biglaiser and Friedman 1994; Li 1998; Van Raalte and Webers 1998; Rubinstein and Wollinsky 1985; Jori and Leach 2002) , or as being purely exploitative (Masters 2007 (Masters , 2008 . This article builds on this literature by allowing for the presence of both types of middlemen in the same market.
The Role of Moral Norms in Strategic Interactions in Agricultural Markets
A large body of literature examines the role that social preferences can play in determining economic outcomes. There are various ways to model these types of preferences, for example, inequity aversion, reciprocity, spite, guilt, and social norms. In this article, I will focus on one particular form of social preferences, that is, the willingness to deviate from a moral norm. The idea is that an internal norm exists such that an individual may experience some feeling of shame or guilt as a result of departures from that norm, even if it is not observed by anyone else and no external punishment is experienced. Bowles and Gintis (2006) model this feeling of guilt as a negative payoff in an individual's utility function when he deviates from a particular behavior. The idea of moral norms is related to but distinct from social norms, which are enforced through punishment by others in the social group. Moral norms are more specific to the individual and related to their own self-image and sense of right and wrong.
2 Further, moral norms can be thought of as driven by the idea of sympathy, or feeling for the other person involved in a strategic interaction.
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Many economists have discussed the important role that morality can play in markets, going back as far as Adam Smith. Indeed, in Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith (1790) explicitly makes reference to this idea of feeling for others, or sympathy, which is felt by all human beings and also emphasizes that some people may feel it more strongly than others. Arrow (2006) also refers to the limitations of assuming pure self-interest on the part of economic agents and discusses how morality plays an important role in market interactions: "It turns out that to a considerable extent, people spontaneously do avoid taking excessive advantage of their inside information, their private information . . . Part of this behavior, though, is morality -the person doesn't cheat because he thinks it's the wrong thing to do."
A number of sources have discussed the importance of ideas related to morality or trustworthiness in the context of agricultural markets in developing countries. In a detailed case study of tomato marketing in Ghana, Adimabuno (2010) provides many examples of transactions taking place on the basis of trust and the assumption that individuals will behave in a moral way. Adimabuno emphasizes that this is not just because of reputational concerns or repeated interactions, but also because individuals have a sense of what is morally appropriate behavior and wish to adhere to it. In particular, Adimabuno (2010) 2 This is similar to Akerloff and Kranton's (2000) idea of prescriptions, although that relates to belonging to a particular group in society and having a specific identity derived from that group with prescribed actions associated with it. The moral norms idea is more individualistic and comes from an individual's personality, upbringing, and past life experiences, although the cultural norms in their environment will of course also have an influence on this. Andrews and Marcoul (2016) show how other kinds of social preferences, for example regarding spite and inequity aversion, can be influenced by experiences in early life.
3 This is not the same as pure altruism or inequity aversion, although they may be related. It would be possible to have a quite unequal distribution of surplus that is still considered "fair" or "right" in a moral sense based on cultural norms or ideas about power or status.
finds that "Many buyers . . . find it morally difficult to beat down prices since they understand the impoverished situation of farmers." However, Adimabuno also discusses many situations where individuals take advantage of this trust and cheat in the market, suggesting that this concern with morality is far from universal. A number of personal stories from market participants reinforce both the idea that morality influences decision making in agricultural markets, and also the fact that some individuals are very willing to take advantage of the trust placed in them by other actors in the market. 4 
Model

Description of Economic Environment
A number of characteristics of the relationship between a farmer and a middleman are specific to a developing country setting. The key characteristics I will focus on in this article are the following: (a) middlemen are better informed about market conditions than farmers; (b) farmers face high transport costs to go to the market themselves; (c) farmers often trade with the same middleman for multiple periods; and (d) the existence of frictions in the market means it is not costless for the farmer to find a different middleman to trade with. The model presented in this section will aim to capture these characteristics in the simplest way possible.
The core intuition of the model is most easily demonstrated using a two-period model where there are only two possible values of the price. I will describe a two-period model of trade between a farmer and a middleman. At the start of the first period, a farmer and middleman are matched and have an opportunity to trade. The farmer has a good that has a market price, p. This price is independently and identically distributed in each period, with p 2 p L ; p H ; p H > p L f , and Pr p ¼ p H ð Þ¼k. The middleman observes the actual market price in each period, p t , but the farmer knows only the distribution of p. The middleman makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, x t , to the farmer. The farmer can accept the middleman's offer or he can go to the market himself to sell the good but he must pay a transport cost, s, in order to do so. The middleman's transport costs are normalized to zero. Gains from trade exist as the middleman's transport costs are lower than those of the farmer. The middleman's outside option is also normalized to zero.
In the middleman's utility function I will allow for the possibility that, in addition to his monetary payoff, he also cares about adherence to a moral norm. I will assume that, given a particular market price, the middleman has an idea of what he would consider to be a morally appropriate division of surplus between himself and the farmer. Let the offer representing this moral norm be denoted by x p ð Þ, and let it equal p t À as, where a represents the share of the surplus that the middleman receives.
5 It does not need to be the case that the moral norm implies that the farmer receives a very large share of the surplus but simply that his share is greater than zero. The middleman may suffer some disutility if his offer deviates from this moral norm. If an offer, x t , is accepted by the farmer, then in that period middleman i will receive the following utility:
I assume that the middleman may be one of two types, autonomous or social, i 2 A; S f , with Pr i ¼ A ð Þ¼q. The autonomous middleman has h ¼ 0 and so does not care at all about adherence to moral norms. The social middleman has h > 0 , and therefore suffers some disutility from making an offer that deviates from his moral norm. 6 The farmer does not know the type of a given middleman but he does know that the probability that he is a type A is equal to q.
A number of authors have introduced a term into the utility function to represent a "psychic" or "moral" cost to taking an action 4 Source: Linking Local Learners. Available at: http://www.linkin glearners.net/.
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It is possible that the moral norm regarding the share the farmer receives could be different in the high and low price conditions, that is, a could depend on the price. However, as long as it does not vary to the point where the monetary offer made in both the high and low price setting becomes the same, the results of the model should not change significantly.
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The heterogeneity between middlemen is being modelled here as a difference in the cost to the middleman of deviating from a particular moral norm. Alternatively, it could be modelled as having a different moral norm, that is, a could be equal to one for one of the middlemen. This should not qualitatively change the results of the model as either way the term related to social preferences would equal zero for the autonomous middleman.
that does not perfectly correspond with what they would consider to be the morally appropriate action or to represent the cost of deviating from an equitable division of surplus (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Ferraro and Price 2013) . Bowles and Gintis (2006) use a functional form very similar to that presented above and suggest that the parameter h i represents the individual's level of guilt over not living up to his ideals. 7 For simplicity, I assume that there is only one type of farmer. It is assumed that the farmer cares only about the monetary value of the offer that he receives and does not suffer disutility if it deviates from the moral norm. 8 At the end of the first period, the farmer may decide to stay matched with the same middleman for the second period, or he may pay a cost j to be matched with a new middleman. The type of the second middleman is an independent draw from an identical distribution to that of the first middleman. The parameter j is intended to capture the ease with which a farmer can find a new trading partner. This switching cost is exogenous in the model and entry and exit in the middleman market is not modeled here. If the farmer decides to switch to a new middleman, then the first middleman will receive zero in the second period. In the second period, the middleman observes p 2 and makes an offer, x 2 , to the farmer, which the farmer may accept or reject. There is no discounting. It is assumed that the farmer and the autonomous middleman are risk-neutral and aim to maximize the expected sum of their own payoffs from the two periods. 9 I will make the following assumption about the parameter values:
This assumption will imply that it is always better for a farmer to trade with a social middleman than an autonomous middleman, regardless of the value of the market price. This assumption is not necessary for the results of the model to hold but it makes the analysis more straightforward by eliminating a number of mixed strategy equilibria.
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Equilibrium This is a two-period game of incomplete information between the farmer and the middleman and in what follows I will characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game. There are two sources of incomplete information for the farmer: (a) the market price and (b) the middleman's social preferences (social type). This means that from the farmer's point of view there are four possible scenarios regarding a given middleman in a particular time period: (a) social, high price; (b) social, low price; (c) autonomous, high price; and (d) autonomous, low price. I will specify a strategy for each possible type of middleman in each scenario that indicates the offers that will be made in periods 1 and 2. The farmer's strategy will consist of two decision rules. The first will map x 1 and x 2 into an acceptance or rejection of the middleman's offer in a given period. This decision will depend on the belief that the farmer has regarding the value of the market price. The second decision rule will map x 1 into a choice about whether or not to switch to a different middleman for the second period. This will depend on his beliefs about the social type of the middleman. Let q x ð Þ represent the probability that the farmer accepts an offer x, and 7 These authors argue that the symmetry of guilt around the ideal value, x, makes sense if we think the individual also has norms around how the rest of his income could be allocated (e.g., his own family's well-being) and so will also suffer guilt if he makes an offer that is more generous than the norm as that will divert resources from other areas. If we do not think it is reasonable that the middleman would suffer the same moral cost to a division which gives the farmer a larger share of the surplus than the moral norm, a different utility function could be used that assumes that the squared term only enters the utility function when x t < x. The cost to a higher division could either be zero or have a different weighting. This would not significantly alter the results since the monetary cost of increasing the share to the farmer means that it would never be optimal for the middleman to offer a higher share than the moral norm.
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The aim of the disutility term is to represent some guilt that the middleman feels from taking an action that is not morally appropriate. The farmer cannot influence the division of the surplus and therefore whether or not his action is morally appropriate is not relevant.
9
In reality, it is likely that both farmers and middleman are riskaverse. Most other papers that have modeled bargaining between farmers and middlemen rely on the assumption of risk aversion to generate an effect of information. The assumption of risk neutrality is made here both for simplicity and to highlight the importance of a different channel through which market price information can influence the prices that farmers receive from middleman. 10 This assumption implies that the surplus from trade is relatively large in comparison with the dispersion of the market price. This does not seem unreasonable given that transport costs in many developing countries are often very high. r x ð Þ represent the probability that the farmer continues to trade with the same middleman for the second period. The farmer's beliefs regarding the market price will be treated separately from his beliefs regarding the middleman's social preferences as they are important for different decisions that the farmer will make.
In what follows, the equilibrium outcomes of this game will be compared with those of a game where the farmer has complete information about market prices. In that situation, the only uncertainty will be regarding the social preferences of the middleman, so, in a given period, there will only be two possible types of middleman-social and autonomous.
Second Period
In either period, the farmer will accept an offer, x t , as long as
g represents the farmer's posterior belief that p t ¼ p H given the offer made by the middleman.
The farmer's optimal strategy will be as follows:
& Let S ij denote the offer made by a middleman in scenario ij, where i 2 S; A f g represents the middleman's social type and j 2 H; L f g represents the value of the market price in that period. In the second period, the decision problem of the autonomous middleman, in each price scenario, can be represented by ð3Þ max
In this period, the middleman is not concerned with disguising his social type. Therefore, the optimal strategy of the autonomous middleman will be
which is the minimum amount acceptable to the farmer.
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The decision problem of the social middleman, for each price scenario, can be represented by ð4Þ max
If unconstrained by the minimum acceptable amount to the farmer, the optimal offer for the social middleman will be p j À as
that is, the constraint of the minimum acceptable amount to the farmer will not be binding for the social type when the price is low if the farmer's beliefs about the market price after observing the offer are the same as his prior beliefs. This will also be true for p ¼ p H . There therefore exists a semi-separating equilibrium, where
The offer made by the social type reveals full information both about their type and the market price. The offer made by the autonomous type reveals full information about their type but no information about the market price, and therefore g ¼ k. A mixed strategy equilibrium also exists, details of which can be found in the supplementary online appendix.
If the farmer had full information, the only difference in this period would be that the autonomous type would offer p H À s when the market price is high and p L À s when the market price is low. Therefore, the expected offer received from the autonomous type would be the same as the offer made when the farmer is uninformed. The offers of the social type would remain the same. This means that there would be no difference in the average offer received by the farmer with or without market price information. Based on the predictions of the model for behavior in this period, the following hypothesis will be tested in the empirical section:
HYPOTHESIS 1 (a) There is no benefit to the farmer of being informed about the market price in the second period; (b) the autonomous type makes a lower offer to the farmer than the social type in the second period; and (c) the autonomous type does not increase his offer relative to that of the social type in the second period when the farmer is informed about the market price.
Decision to Switch
Let l x denote the farmer's belief that the type of the middleman he is currently 11 In order for the middleman to be willing to offer the farmer the expected value of his outside option, the following must be true:
This will be true if s > kðp H À p L Þ, which will be the case given assumption 1. matched with is A, given x 1 . The farmer's expected payoff if he is matched with an autonomous middleman in the second period is E p ð Þ À s. The social middleman will offer p t À as À 1 h . Therefore, the expected gain for a farmer from being matched with a social middleman rather than an autonomous middleman in the second period is equal to 1 À a ð Þs À 1 h . The farmer will decide to switch to a new middleman if his expected gain from switching, based on his beliefs about the middleman's type, is higher than the cost, that is,
The farmer forms his beliefs, l x , according to Bayes' rule. The calculation of the beliefs for each possible offer made by the middleman can be found in the appendix.
First Period
In the first period, the middleman must now be concerned about the farmer's decision to switch and this may mean that the autonomous type wishes to disguise his type. Let x L denote the equilibrium offer made by the social type when the market price is low and x H denote the equilibrium offer made by the social type when the market price is high. It is reasonable to assume that the farmer's posterior beliefs will assign a probability of zero to the social type for any other x. Given that this is the case, there are three possible equilibrium strategies for the autonomous types of middleman: x L ; x H ; or x A , where
Given that any offer other than x L or x H will lead the farmer to believe that the middleman is type A with probability 1, x A dominates any other x 0 6 2 x L ; x H f g.
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The autonomous middleman must weigh up the extra gain from offering a low price in this period against the probability of losing the farmer's trade next period if the farmer's belief that he is an autonomous type is high enough for him to switch. The more costly it is for the farmer to switch, the less the middleman has to worry about disguising his type because even if the farmer's belief that he is type A is very high, he still might not be willing to pay the cost to switch. In the extreme case, when the cost of switching is high enough, the middleman can reveal his social type and the farmer still won't switch. This leads us to Proposition 1. PROPOSITION 1. If the switching cost in the market is high, that is,
, a semi-separating equilibrium exists where full information about the middleman's social type is revealed. For these parameter values, improving the farmer's access to price information will not increase the expected price that he receives in the first period.
If
, it is too costly for the farmer to switch to a different middleman even if he knows for certain that the one he is matched with is type A. Given that this is true, type A has no incentive to disguise his type and therefore will offer the lowest price that the farmer will be willing to accept, which is x A . Since the autonomous middleman is already revealing his type, price information will not help the farmer to get a higher price. A formal proof of this proposition and those that follow can be found in the appendix. 
semiseparating equilibrium exists where full information about the social type of the middleman is not revealed. For this level of the switching cost, the expected price that the farmer receives in the first period will be higher with price information.
Since
, if the farmer knows that the middleman's type is A with certainty, then he will switch to a different middleman for the second period. Therefore, in order not to lose the farmer's trade in the second period, the autonomous middleman must play a pooling strategy with the offer made by the social middleman in one of the pricing scenarios. When the farmer is uninformed about the market price, the autonomous middleman can pool with the low-price social type, even when the market price is high. If j is high enough, then there will be an equilibrium where the farmer will not switch when he receives an offer of x L . This is because the probability that the middleman is a social type with a low price is high enough that the farmer does not want to pay the cost of switching.
If the middleman offers x 0 > x A , his payoff in the first period will be lower without changing the probability that the farmer will continue to trade with him in the second period and, if he offers x 0 < x A , the farmer will reject his offer and take up his outside option instead.
If, on the other hand, the farmer knows that the price is high, an offer of x L will reveal the middleman's social type. Now, the autonomous type must always offer x H when the price is high and so the expected price that the farmer receives is higher when he is informed about the market price.
, as the switching cost decreases, the benefit to the farmer of being informed about the market price also decreases.
, the farmer will prefer to switch to a new middleman when he receives a low offer if the autonomous type's strategy when the price is high is to always offer x L . That means that this can no longer be an equilibrium. Now, this type of middleman must sometimes offer x H in order for the farmer to remain indifferent between staying matched with him and switching to a new middleman. The probability that the type A middleman offers x H when the price is high c AH ð Þ increases as the cost of switching decreases, which means that the benefit to the farmer of being informed about the price also decreases. In order for the middleman to be willing to offer x H , the farmer must now sometimes switch away from the middleman when he receives an offer of x L . Values for c AH and the probability that the farmer switches when he receives a low offer r L ð Þ can be found in the appendix.
While the inclusion of risk-aversion in the model presented here might change the cutoff points for j described above, most of the qualitative predictions of the model should not change. The only exception is that there would be a reduction in the minimum acceptable offer to the farmer when he is uninformed, which would result in a positive effect of information for all values of j. However, the differential effect of information at different values of j should still exist.
The model generates the following testable hypotheses regarding the farmer's switching behavior and behavior in the first round.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (a) The farmer does not switch when the cost of switching is medium or high; (b) the farmer does not switch when he is informed about the market price; and (c) the farmer sometimes switches when he is uninformed about the market price, the cost of switching is low and he receives a low, offer from the middleman.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (a) There is a non-monotonic relationship between the benefit to the farmer of being informed about the market price in the first period and the cost of switching; (b) the autonomous type makes a lower offer to the farmer than the social type in the first period when the farmer is uninformed; and (c) the autonomous type increases his offer relative to that of the social type in the first period when the farmer is informed about the market price.
Experimental Design and Procedures
In this section, I will describe the details of a framed field experiment that I carried out with farmers and middlemen in Gujarat, India, in order to test the predictions of the model. A key assumption of the model is that there are different types of middlemen who have different social preferences, which cause them to make different offers to farmers. Carrying out a lab experiment with actual farmers and middlemen is a first step in investigating whether or not this is the case in reality.
The participants were recruited by Reuters Market Light, an organization that runs an SMS-based (Short Message Service) agricultural information service for farmers in India. Each session had an average of twenty participants, half of whom were farmers and half of whom were middlemen, and there were fifteen sessions in total. 13 The total number of participants was 314. More details on the recruitment of participants and the experimental procedures can be found in the supplementary online appendix.
Middleman Social Type
The key dimension of heterogeneity addressed in the model is social preferences, particularly willingness to deviate from moral norms, and so it is important to obtain a 13 A number of sessions had twenty-two or twenty-four, one session had eighteen, and one session had fourteen. measure for this in the experiment. Keeping this in mind, the participants were asked to play two games at the beginning of the experimental session that were designed to elicit their social preferences. The first game was a simple dictator game. The participants were told that they would each be given fifty Indian Rupees (INR). The participants were also told that they had been randomly and anonymously matched with another participant to whom they could give some of this money. They were asked how many rupees they would like to give to the other participant.
14 The distribution of middleman offers from the dictator game is shown in figure 1 and the distribution of farmer offers is shown in figure 2 . The participants were then asked to play a game designed to test their interpersonal orientation. This test requires participants to make a choice between three possible allocations of points to themselves and an anonymous "other." The options consist of one choice that maximizes the points allocated to oneself, another that equalizes the payoffs to both but gives a lower payoff to oneself than the first choice, and a final choice that maximizes the relative payoff to oneself but gives a lower absolute payoff than the first choice. Each option corresponds to a different personality type: individualistic, prosocial, or competitive (Van Lange et al. 1997 ). The instructions for the game are provided in the supplementary online appendix. The participants are required to make nine such choices It is important to note that this is not a standard dictator game as in this game all participants receive some money and can choose how much to give away. I wanted to elicit the preferences of all participants, however, so it was decided that this was the best way to do this. The results are therefore not comparable to a standard dictator game but they do generate an ordinal measure of social preferences that can be used in the empirical analysis.
with different payoff values. If they make six or more choices consistent with one of the types then they are classified as that type.
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It has been shown in previous studies that participants' offers in ultimatum games, and whether or not they behave strategically, are correlated with this measure of personality type (van Djik, de Cremer, and Handgraff 2002; Carpenter 2003) . The proportions of middlemen and farmers of each type are shown in figures 3 and 4, respectively.
The results from these games support the assumption that middlemen vary in their preferences and provide us with a number of different potential measures of an "autonomous" type of middleman. The model focuses on the middleman's willingness to deviate from a moral norm, and this is motivated by the idea that the middleman feels some sympathy for the farmer that prevents him from entirely exploiting his bargaining power. It seems reasonable to assume that a middleman who feels a greater sense of sympathy for the farmer will contribute more in the dictator game and be most likely to make prosocial choices, and least likely to make competitive choices in the test of interpersonal orientation. Boles, Croson, and Murnighan (2000) discuss some of the literature related to these categories in the test of interpersonal orientation. These authors state that previous work has found that competitive types are more likely to endorse tactics that win at the expense of others, whereas cooperatives (prosocial types) are more likely to be concerned with the morality of their actions and are extremely unwilling to lie. Their discussion suggests that the competitive types are the least likely to demonstrate sympathy for others in a strategic interaction. In the analysis that follows, I will use two different measures of an autonomous type. The first is middlemen who were classified as "competitive" on the test of interpersonal orientation. The second is middlemen who gave less than fifteen INR in the dictator game. Details of robustness checks that investigate how the results change when alternative measures of autonomous types are used can be found in the supplementary online appendix.
Bargaining Game
The experiment had six different treatment cells: there were two information treatments (informed and uninformed) combined with three costs of switching (ten, forty, and ninety INR). These costs of switching were chosen to map onto the different regions of j described in the model, assuming that q was equal to 1 2 . The values for the parameters of the game were chosen to give the participants a large enough expected payoff that they would care about the outcome of the game. There were five possible values for the price, ranging from 350 INR to 550 INR. The farmer's transport costs were set equal to 300 INR. In the setup of the model, the middleman's outside option was normalized to zero. However, piloting showed that participants strongly dislike the possibility of getting a payoff of zero, and this affects their choices in the game, so it was decided to give them a small, non-zero outside option instead. A summary of the parameter values can be found in table 1.
Since there were likely to be significant differences between participants in different sessions and there were only fifteen sessions in total, it was decided that all of the participants should each play all six types of game.
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The participants were paid for both periods of one of the games that was selected randomly at the end. In general, middlemen tend to be wealthier than farmers and results from piloting suggested that the amounts of money involved were not as significant for the middlemen. In order to get them to care more about the game, therefore, one middleman was chosen randomly at the end of each session, and that middleman's payoff from the game was tripled. Participants were informed of this before the game was played.
A summary of the timing of the bargaining game follows:
1. Farmers and middlemen are matched into pairs for game 1. 2. All participants are told the cost of switching for that game and whether the 15 Approximately 20% of the participants are unclassified. The unclassified subjects remain in the sample. The comparison is between middlemen classified as "autonomous" with all other middlemen in the sample. The aim is to identify those middlemen who deviate most strongly from a moral norm of sharing some division of surplus with the farmer, and I believe that those who consistently choose the "competitive" options best represent that group.
This means that the comparisons between treatments are between identical samples of farmers and middlemen, as offers and responses from each participant are included in each treatment group. farmers will be informed or uninformed about the price. 3. Period 1 begins. The price for period 1 is chosen and told to the middlemen and also to the farmers in the informed treatments. 4. Each middleman writes down his offer on the offer sheet. This sheet is passed to the farmer that he has been matched with. Each farmer chooses to accept or reject the middleman's offer. 5. Each farmer is given a sheet of paper asking whether he wants to stay matched with the same middleman for the second period or pay a cost to be matched with a new middleman. He chooses to switch or not to switch. 6. Farmers who choose to switch are matched with a different middleman for the second period. This means that some middlemen are matched with two farmers for the second period. These middlemen were told that they should make offers to two farmers but they would only get paid for one of the offers, which would be selected randomly. 7. Period 2 begins. The price for period 2 is chosen and told to the middlemen and also to the farmers in the informed treatments. 8. Each middleman who is playing in this period writes down his offer on the offer sheet (or two offer sheets if he is matched with two farmers). This sheet is passed to the farmer that he has been matched with. Each farmer chooses to accept or reject the middleman's offer. 9. Game 1 ends. 10. Each farmer is matched with a different middleman for game 2. 11. The above steps are repeated five times, once for each treatment type, that is, six games are played in total.
Experimental Results
This section will present the results from the experiment following the order in which the hypotheses were presented in the theoretical section. In order to help interpret the magnitude of the results, table 2 presents some summary statistics for the offers made by the middlemen, broken down by price and information treatment.
Second Period Offers
Results are presented for a number of different regression specifications but the main specification used is the following:
where Offer ijt is the offer made by middleman i in session j and period t, Price t is the market price in period t, Informed t is a dummy equal to one if the farmers knew the market price in period t, Autonomous i is a dummy equal to one if middleman i is classified as an autonomous type, and u j is a session fixed effect. Table 3 presents the results from ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions from the second period of the game. Standard errors are clustered at the middleman level, giving a total of 157 clusters. 17 The average effect of information is presented in column 1. Columns 2 and 3 report results for the measure of autonomous type based on the test of interpersonal orientation, and columns 4 and 5 report the results for the measure of autonomous type based on the dictator game. The first thing to note is that hypothesis 1(a) can be rejected, as there is a positive effect of information. The model predicts that the offer that the middleman makes in the second period should not be affected by whether or not the farmer is informed. However, it can be seen from the results in table 3 that even in the second period, the average offer that the farmer receives is around 17 INR higher when he is informed about the market price. The most likely explanation for this result is that farmers are risk averse, which would mean that they would be willing to accept a lower offer rather than face the uncertainty of going to the market themselves. Further evidence that supports this explanation can be found in the supplementary online appendix.
The inclusion of a dummy for an autonomous type in columns 2 and 4 clearly shows that certain types of middlemen make lower offers in the second period and therefore provides support for hypothesis 1(b). These results demonstrate that differences in social preferences do exist among actual middlemen and these differences translate into significantly lower offers for farmers. In addition, the results in columns 3 and 5 support hypothesis 1(c) by demonstrating that these middlemen do not adjust their offers in this period to make them as high as the offers of social middlemen when the farmer is informed about the price.
Decision to Switch
Hypotheses 2 (a) and (b) will be tested with a Probit model using the following specification:
where S ijt is a dummy equal to one if farmer i, in session j, decided to switch in period t, Informed t is a dummy equal to one if the farmers knew the market price in period t, Medium cos t t is a dummy equal to one if the cost of switching in period t was 40 INR, High cos t t is a dummy equal to one if the cost of switching in period t was equal to 90 INR, and u j is a session fixed effect. The standard errors are clustered at the farmer level, giving a total of 157 clusters. Note: Asterisks indicate the following: ***¼ p < 0.01, **¼ p < 0.05, and *¼ p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered at the middleman level. Session fixed effects are included in all regressions. Informed is a dummy equal to one when the farmer knows the market price.
The predicted margins at each level of the switching cost and each information treatment are presented in the first column in table 4. The model predicts that there will be no switching at all when the farmer is informed and when the cost of switching is medium or high. This is clearly not the case as, although the overall incidence of switching was fairly low (11%), sometimes the farmers did decide to switch when the cost of switching was high or they were informed about the market prices. This means that hypotheses 2(a) and (b) can be rejected. However, including interaction terms between the informed dummy and the switching costs shows that the pattern of switching does go in the general direction that the model would predict. The predicted margins for this specification are given in the second column in table 4 and are also represented in figure 5. When the farmer is informed, the degree of switching is not significantly different for different levels of the cost. However, when the farmer is uninformed he is more likely to switch when the switching cost is low. This provides some support for hypothesis 2(c).
This hypothesis also states that in this case the farmer should be more likely to switch when the offer is low. In order to test the effect of the offer, it makes sense to analyze the uninformed treatment group and informed treatment group separately. For the informed group, the value of the offer relative to the market price should be the most important factor. The farmers in the uninformed group do not know the value of the market price, and therefore they can only be influenced by the absolute value of the offer. The following model is estimated for the informed group:
where Relative O ffer t is the offer received in period t, divided by the market price in that period. The marginal effects for the offer and relative offer are presented in table 5 for each Figure 5 . Predicted margins at different switching costs value of the switching cost, and the marginal effects for the relative offer are also represented graphically in figure 6 . As expected, the absolute value of the offer does not have an impact on the farmer's decision to switch when he is informed about the market price. The farmer is more likely to switch when the relative offer that he receives is lower. However, his sensitivity to a lower relative offer seems to be the same regardless of the switching cost. The following model is estimated for the uninformed group:
The marginal effects for the offer are presented in table 6 for each value of the switching cost and are also represented graphically in figure 7. While not statistically significant, the results suggest that the farmer's decision to switch may be more sensitive to receiving a lower offer when the switching cost is low.
While the results do not support the predictions of the model exactly, they do suggest not only that different types of middlemen exist and make different offers, but also that the farmers are aware of this. If there were no differences in middlemen types then there would be no reason for the farmer to pay a cost to switch to a different middleman for the second period.
First Period Offers
The results in this section are presented for a number of different regression specifications but the main specification used is the following: 
where Offer ijt is the offer made by middleman i in session j and period t, Price t is the market price in period t, Informed t is a dummy equal to one if the farmers knew the market price in period t, Low cos t t is a dummy equal to one if the cost of switching is 10 INR in period t, Medium cos t t is a dummy equal to one if the cost of switching is 40 INR in period t, Autonomous i is a dummy equal to one if middleman i is classified as an autonomous type, and u j is a session fixed effect. Table 7 presents the results from OLS regressions from the first period of the game. As can be seen from column 1 in the table, in all treatments there is a benefit to the farmer of being informed. The benefit of information is highest in the low-cost treatment, and there is no significant difference between the benefit of information in the medium-and highcost treatments. As was shown in the previous section, the probability that the farmer switched was very similar when the cost of switching was 40 INR and when it was 90 INR, which supports the idea that participants did not behave differently in these two treatments. The results do not provide strong support for hypothesis 3(a), that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching, although they do demonstrate that the benefit of information is dependent upon the cost of switching. The results from table 3 could help to explain these findings. These results suggest that the difference between the offer made by the autonomous type and the social type is much lower than initially assumed. The highest estimate that is found for this difference is 38.43 INR. If this is the expected gain from being matched with a social type rather than an autonomous type, then any switching when the cost of switching is 40 INR or above should not be expected, and the benefit of information should disappear at this point. As mentioned before, I still find a positive effect of information for the 40 INR and 90 INR treatments, but the magnitude of this effect is similar to that found in the case of second-period offers. According to the model, only some middlemen should use the farmer's lack of information to make lower offers in the first period. This means there should be a greater advantage to being informed when matched with one of these middlemen. Columns 2 and 3 report the results for regressions where a middleman is classified as an autonomous type if he was classified as "competitive" on the test of interpersonal orientation. These results provide support for hypothesis 3(b) and show that this type of middleman makes offers that are on average 47.96 INR lower than other middlemen. When an interaction term with information is included in column 3, this reduction in offers increases to 66.96 INR, but these same middlemen increase their offers by 37.99 INR more than social types when the farmer is informed about the price, thus providing support for hypothesis 3(c). Columns 4 and 5 present results from the same regression with a middleman classified as an autonomous type if he gave 15 INR or less during the dictator game. The results are similar in terms of sign, although they are smaller in magnitude and the coefficient on the interaction of autonomous type with information is no longer significantly different from zero. These results are robust to using alternative measures of middleman types and the inclusion of farmer types, and a measure for farmers' risk aversion. Results for these specifications can be found in the supplementary online appendix.
Summary of Results
It is clear from the results of the experiment that actual middlemen differ in their social preferences and this has relevance for the offers that they make to farmers in the game. While it is not possible to say that there is a non-monotonic relationship between the benefit of information and the cost of switching based on these data, the results do show that the benefit of information varies with the cost of switching and are consistent with the predictions of the model. Farmers are better off with information in both periods but there is an additional benefit of being informed in the first period if the cost of switching is low. This is driven by the result that autonomous types will offer lower prices if the farmer is uninformed, but are forced to offer higher prices if the farmer is informed in order to prevent the farmer from switching away from him. These results are consistent with reports from farmers who state that middlemen can no longer take advantage of them when they have better information about market prices.
Conclusion
This article presented a theoretical model outlining an important channel through which better access to market information could increase the prices that farmers receive from middlemen. The model introduced the idea of different types of middlemen and demonstrated how price information constrains the ability of autonomous types to offer lower prices to farmers, and forces them instead to behave like social types. The model also predicts that the relationship between the benefit of information to the farmer and the cost of switching in the market will be non-monotonic. This could explain why the results from empirical studies investigating the impact of information on producer prices have been mixed.
The article provided empirical support for the predictions of the model from a framed field experiment carried out with actual farmers and middlemen in India. The results from the experiment demonstrate that social preferences do vary among actual middlemen. By obtaining an exogenous measure of the middlemen's social type, it was possible to show that middlemen who cared less about moral norms also made lower offers to farmers in the second period. Providing farmers with information about prices counteracted this effect in the first period as it forced the autonomous middlemen to make higher offers, demonstrating that this is an important channel through which information could benefit farmers. In addition, the results from the experiment showed that the benefit of information varied with the cost of switching to a different middleman.
The results from the model and the experiment suggest that even when farmers' options of who to trade with during a given period are constrained, informing farmers about market prices can lead to an increase in the offer that the farmer receives from the middleman. This positive effect of information is a consequence of unobserved heterogeneity among middlemen. There is one type of middleman that the farmer prefers to trade with, and a lack of information about the market price makes it easier for the less-desirable type of middleman to disguise his type.
In general, the literature has tended to either view middlemen as purely exploitative or as fulfilling a necessary role in the market. The results in this article suggest that we should take a more nuanced view and allow not just for the possibility that the truth lies somewhere in between but also that different types of middlemen may exist in the same market and some may be more exploitative than others. It is important to bear this in mind when carrying out empirical studies.
The results presented in this article have important policy implications. Intervening directly in the middleman market to try to reduce market power could be extremely challenging. A second option for achieving the goal of higher prices for farmers could be to provide them with information about market prices. However, it is clear that providing farmers with price information may not always increase the prices that they receive as the value of this information depends on their ability to act on it.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material are available at American Journal of Agricultural Economics online. 1 h À Á , then r Ã A ¼ 0. Likewise, if the farmer receives an offer of x L , his optimal strategy will be as follows: À Á , a semi-separating equilibrium exists where full information about the middleman's social type is revealed. For these parameter values, improving the farmer's access to price information will not increase the expected price that he receives in the first period. Proof. The equilibrium strategies of each type of middleman are as follows:
The equilibrium strategy for the farmer regarding the decision to accept is the same as in the final period. The decision of the farmer regarding whether or not to switch to a different middleman will depend on his belief regarding the social type of the middleman. Given the strategies of each type of middleman, when the farmer receives an offer of x A , he will assign a probability of one to the middleman being an autonomous type, that is, l A ¼ 1. As shown in the section above, for this belief the farmer will not switch if j > 1 À q ð Þ 1 À a ð Þs À 1 h À Á . Therefore, making this offer is optimal for the autonomous middleman and this is an equilibrium.
If the farmer were informed about the market price, his expected payoff would not change. The equilibrium strategy for the social type would be as before: p t À as À 1 h . The autonomous type would now offer the actual market price less s, instead of the expected price but, in expectation, this means the farmer's payoff would be the same. , the middleman will always prefer to offer x H if offering x A will cause the farmer to switch with certainty. This will be true under assumption 1. If it is not optimal for him to offer x A when p ¼ p H , then it will not be optimal for him to offer x A when p ¼ p L . (b) Suppose the autonomous middleman always offers x L , regardless of the value of the market price. Therefore, the farmer's belief that the middleman is an autonomous type when he receives a low offer will equal
PROOF
As long as j > l L À q ð Þ 1 À a ð Þs À 1 h À Á , then the cost of switching is high enough that the farmer will not switch. This implies that if j > kq 1Àq ð Þ qþ 1Àq ð Þ 1Àk ð Þ 1 À a ð Þs À 1 h À Á , even if the farmer knows that the autonomous type always offers x L , he still will not switch when he receives an offer of x L since the probability that he is matched with a social type (but the market price is low) is high enough that it is not worth paying the cost to switch. Since the farmer will never switch when he receives an offer of x L , it is not optimal for the middleman to ever make a higher offer. If the farmer is informed about the market price then the high-price autonomous type must offer x H in order not to reveal his type and therefore cause the farmer to switch. Therefore, a pooling equilibrium will exist where the autonomous type always makes the same offer as the social type, and
